PT Sarana Menara Nusantara Tbk.Full report →1 / 14
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PT Sarana Menara Nusantara Tbk.

PT Sarana Menara Nusantara is Indonesia's largest tower landlord by revenue, leasing 36,247 towers to the country's mobile carriers on long-term contracts; the Hartono family controls about 65% of the shares.

From a January high of Rp625 the shares slid to a Rp316 low in June, then recovered to Rp414 — a six-month round trip that left them near multi-year lows.
Rp414
Share price · 23 Jul 2026
Rp24.5tn
Market capitalisation
Rp13.3tn
FY2025 revenue
6.0×
Price / FY2025 earnings
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The statements

Revenue climbed 54% over five years; per-share earnings did not

FY2021 → FY2025as reported · Rp
RevenueRp13.3T+5%
Operating margin56.3%−0.8pp
Net incomeRp3.7T+9%
EPSRp69.00+3%
Free cash flowRp7.1T+47%
Open the full statements →
As reported, FY2021–FY2025. Operating margin is EBIT; EBITDA margin is higher.
  • Growth, spread thin. Revenue rose from Rp8.6tn in 2021 to Rp13.3tn in 2025, but basic EPS held at Rp69 — successive equity raises spread a slowly-growing profit over more shares.
  • A landlord's margins. The towers convert more than four-fifths of revenue to EBITDA (82%); after depreciation and a finance-cost wedge that takes ~41% of operating profit, about 28% reaches net profit.
  • Cash ahead of earnings. Free cash flow stepped up to Rp7.07tn as capex fell to Rp3.29tn, and net debt/EBITDA dropped to 3.7x from 4.6x.
Valuation gap

The headline free-cash-flow yield is struck before the lenders are paid

From reported cash flow to what reaches equity (Rp bn)
FY2025 audited cash-flow statement; the bridge is drawn by the report.
  • The Rp7.07 trillion of "free cash flow" TOWR reports is struck before it pays its lenders; after Rp2.78 trillion of cash interest and Rp1.26 trillion of lease payments, roughly Rp3.0 trillion actually reaches equity — set against Rp15.5 trillion of debt maturing within a year and Rp2.27 trillion of cash on hand.
  • Real cash, not a mirage. That ~Rp3.0tn still covers the Rp1.19tn dividend about 2.5 times; the correction lowers the yield rather than breaking the thesis.
  • The other side. The debt is investment-grade (S&P BBB-, Fitch AAA(idn)), much of the sub-one-year figure is auto-renewing revolvers, and management paid down more than its own operations generated — so in normal markets the rollover is routine.
Control and capital

The controlling family is both the largest owner and a lender

~98%
of the Rp5.5tn rights issue funded by the Hartono family
Rp680
Subscription price — above today's Rp414
65.2%
Family stake after the raisefrom 60.0%
~9%
of TOWR's debt owed to family bank BCA
  • The Hartono family funded roughly 98% of TOWR's Rp5.5 trillion rights issue at Rp680 a share — above today's Rp414 — while, through its own bank BCA, sitting on the other side of about 9% of the company's debt: the controller is at once its largest owner and a meaningful lender to it.
  • Conviction, not extraction. Roughly Rp5.4tn of fresh family cash lifted the stake to 65.2% at a price now underwater, diluting minorities below 35% rather than cashing out.
  • Watch the other side. The BCA loan is captive but shrank year-on-year (Rp4.83tn to Rp4.00tn), and director pay is controller-set — benign today, a related party on both sides under stress.
Revenue mix

Growth has moved off the towers and into fibre

FY2025 revenue by line (Rp tn)
Tower tenancies fell to 65% of revenue from 71% in 2023.
  • The durable core is flat. Tower-tenancy income — long-term, non-cancellable leases — grew only ~2% to Rp8.73tn, and now supplies 65% of revenue, down from 71% two years earlier.
  • The growth is lower-margin. VSAT and fibre rose 31% to Rp1.55tn and services to Rp3.05tn, which pulls blended EBITDA margin down from 85% toward 82% even as absolute EBITDA rises.
Carrier consolidation

Three carriers now supply 87% of revenue

Customer concentration (FY2025)
ConcentrationFY2025
Largest customer (XLSmart)42% of revenue
Top three customers87% of revenue
Mobile carriers, post-merger3
Lease term~10-yr, non-cancellable
  • A narrower funnel. The XLSmart merger took Indonesia's mobile market to three carriers; one customer is 42% of revenue and the top three are 87%, so pricing power sits with a shrinking buyer base.
  • The tailwind still runs. Each merged carrier must keep densifying for double-digit data-traffic growth, and the leases are ~10-year and non-cancellable — the demand behind the towers has not gone away.
Colocation engine

Spare tower capacity is the lever that has not yet moved

FY2025 revenue growth by line (%)
Tower income Rp8.73tn (+2.3%); VSAT & fibre Rp1.55tn (+31.4%).
  • The economics turn on tenants per tower. TOWR ended 2025 at 1.67; the next tenant on a standing tower costs almost nothing, so a rising ratio would drop straight to margin — the free option 5G densification could exercise.
  • The ratio has stalled. Tower income grew ~2% while fibre grew 31%, and peer Tower Bersama's ratio slipped from 1.87 to 1.73 as mergers deduplicate tenants — the lever is dormant, not yet proven.
Debt durability

A family-funded balance-sheet reset in one year

Leverage (x)
The sharpest single-year deleveraging in the five-year record.
  • The right direction. The Rp5.5tn rights issue plus internal cash cut net debt/EBITDA to 3.7x from 4.6x and net debt/equity to 1.6x from 2.6x; average borrowing cost fell to 6.0% from 6.5%.
  • Still leveraged, still investment-grade. At 3.7x, net debt is near four years of EBITDA and the repair leaned on fresh equity — but ratings are S&P BBB- / Fitch AAA(idn) with interest cover of 3.9x.
Capital allocation

Capital allocation put the balance sheet first

Capital actions, 2025
ActionWhat happened
Rights issueRp5.5tn raised, all into Protelindo to repay debt
DividendCut to fund deleveraging — DPS Rp24.1 to Rp15.9
Buyback~122m shares (~0.2%) — a signal, not a payout
M&A51% of MAN; 40% of listed fibre operator Remala
  • Discipline in sequence. Equity in to cut leverage, dividend trimmed to match, acquisitions kept small and adjacent in fibre and connectivity, buyback token — not a payout sustained on borrowed money.
  • What a bankruptcy-averse owner wants. A controller that injects capital to repair the balance sheet, rather than defending a dividend with debt, is behaving the right way round for a fallen tower landlord.
The multiple

Priced at half its peers, and below its own history

EV / EBITDA (x)
TOWR audited FY2025; peer multiples on FY2026 estimates, not strictly like-for-like.
  • Cheap on every frame. At ~6x earnings and ~6.2x EV/EBITDA, TOWR trades roughly 40% below its own five-year average and about half its listed peers — despite being the largest by tower count and the strongest cash generator.
  • Not cheap without reason. More leverage than peers and a 42% single-customer both argue for some discount; a discount of half the peer multiple, on a deleveraging landlord, is a wide gap to close on fundamentals.
Forward estimates

Consensus expects slow growth and a re-rating, not re-acceleration

Revenue & EBITDA — actual to consensus (Rp tn)
13 analysts; revenue growth of roughly 2–4.5% a year.
  • Low-single-digit growth. Revenue is seen near Rp13.9tn in 2026 and Rp14.3tn in 2027; EPS dips to about Rp67 on the enlarged share count, then recovers toward Rp72–73 by 2028 — still barely above the Rp69 of 2021.
  • Where the target comes from. Nine of 13 analysts sit at their strongest buy, none negative; the bridge to the Rp685 mean target is deleveraging and a multiple re-rating, not a growth story.
Scenarios

The target ladder against a Rp414 price

Analyst targets and illustrative scenarios (Rp)
13-analyst spread; scenarios are illustrative, not forecasts.
  • An asymmetric spread. The 13-analyst range runs Rp390 low to Rp950 high around a Rp685 mean, some 65% above Rp414; even the most bearish target is only about 6% below today's price.
  • What each side needs. Flat EPS at 5–6x lands near Rp380; a re-rate to TOWR's ~10x historical average on ~Rp72 EPS lands near Rp720. Targets are not floors.
The read

Cheap for real reasons, and perhaps too cheap

~40%
below its own five-year multiple
~Rp3.0tn
equity free cash flow after paying lenders
Rp69
EPS ceiling held since 2021 — the number that must break
  • The bear owns the discount. A landlord that cannot grow per-share earnings and leans on three buyers for 87% of revenue has earned a cheaper multiple than a compounder.
  • The bull owns the asymmetry. 82% EBITDA margins, ~Rp3.0tn of equity FCF covering the dividend 2.5x, active deleveraging, and a controller adding capital above the market.
  • What decides it. Whether the tower-tenancy line stabilises and whether falling finance costs finally let EPS break the Rp69 ceiling it has held for five years.
What to watch

A deleveraged, family-backed landlord that is cheap — for reasons real and possibly overdrawn

Read the full report →

This distills a guided study built chapter by chapter — financials, industry, valuation, control and the balance sheet.

Compiled from the full report · 2026-07-23 · For information, not investment advice.